Abstract: Mobile Ad Hoc Network is a self-configurable and self-organizing wireless network of mobile devices without fixed infrastructure support, which makes it a good candidate as underlying communication network for the Cyber-Physical Systems in emergency conditions such as earthquake, flood, and battlefields. In these scenarios, efficient communication schemes with security support are especially desired. Two cryptography approaches, the public key cryptography and the identitybased cryptography, face the costly and complex key management problem and the "key escrow" problem in the real-life deployment. Recently, the certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced to address these problems in previous approaches. However, the efficiency of the schemes based on CL-PKC is not high and can be improved further. In this paper, we present an improved certificateless signature scheme (McCLS) based on bilinear pairings. First, we theoretically compare the efficiency of McCLS with that of existing certificateless signature schemes (CLS). Second, an empirical study is conducted to compare the traditional AODV with the McCLS scheme based on AODV (McDV) in their efficiency and effectiveness against two most common attacks (i.e. redirection attack and rushing attack). Results from theoretical analysis show that the new McCLS scheme is more efficient than existing CLS solutions, and results from empirical studies show that the McDV is able to resist the two common attacks without causing substantial degradation of the network performance.
An efficiently computable bilinear map e provides an algorithm for solving the Decision DiffieHellman Problem (DDHP) [6] . That is, given (P, aP, bP, cP) ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * p , decide whether c ≡ ab ∈ Z * p .
In bilinear pairing, Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy and Computational DiffieHellman (CDH) problem [22] is still hard. That is, for a, b ∈ Z * p , given (P, aP, bP), computing abP is infeasible.
Certificateless scheme
Usually, a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme consists of five polynomial time algorithms [1] :
• Setup. KGC runs a probabilistic algorithm to initialize the system. It receives a security parameter k and returns a randomly chosen master key and a list of public parameters param.
• Extract Partial Private Key. KGC takes the master key and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * as inputs, and outputs a private partial key D ID .
• Generate Key Pair. The user takes a list of public parameters param as inputs, outputs a private key S ID and a public key P ID .
• CL-Sign. The user takes a list of public parameters param, full private keys (D ID , S ID ), and a message M to produce a signature σ on M.
• CL-Verify. Anyone in this algorithm may take {param, ID, P ID } and a message M as inputs, and outputs true if and only if σ is the valid signature, or a symbol ⊥ to indicate a failure.
We may note that, once the user received the public parameters, such as public key of KGC, user chooses secret value to generate his key pair including user's private key and user's public key. Thus the user's full private key is composed of the partial private key generated by KGC and the user's private key generated by user himself. Neither the KGC nor the user can generate the full private keys by himself, therefore solving the "key escrow" problem.
Adversarial Model
As defined in [1, 22] , there are two types of adversaries, Type I and Type II, with different capabilities. In CLS, Type I Adversary A I acts as a third part who tries to impersonate a user. It is not allowed to know the KGC's master private key. However, A I can replace the public key P ID with values of its choice due to nature of the public key generated by the user. This means the adversary is able to fool the user accepting the signature, which is signed by the adversary's public key. Type II adversary A II represents a malicious KGC who knows the master private key. That is, A II can compute the partial private key by itself. But A II does not know the user's private key S ID and it cannot replace the user's public keys P ID .
Definition 1.
A CLS scheme is secure against existential forgery on adaptive chosen message and ID attacks against adversary A, of Type I or Type II if no polynomial time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage against a challenger C in the following game [1]:
1. The challenger C takes a security parameter k and runs the Setup algorithm. Challenger C gives A the system parameters param. If A is of Type I, the challenge C keeps the master private key to itself. Otherwise, C gives the master private key to A.
2.
A can request C to answer the following types of queries:
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• Partial Key Extraction (For Type I adversary only). C returns to A's partial private key D ID as the result of running Extract Partial Private Key algorithm.
• Secret Value and Public Key Extraction. C returns to A's private key S ID associated with A's public key P ID as the result of running Extract Partial Private Key and Generate Key Pair algorithms. In the case of Type I adversary, C returns if the user's public key P ID has been replaced.
• Public Key Replacement (For Type I adversary only). A can replace the associated public key P ID to a new public key P ′ ID which is chosen by itself.
• Sign. C returns a valid signature σ using CL-sign algorithm regardless whether the public key P ID has been replaced or not.
3. Eventually, A outputs a signature (ID * , m * , σ * ). A wins game if Veri f y(param, P ID * , m * , σ * ) = true and the generated output fulfills the following conditions:
• CL-Sign(ID * , m * ) has never been queried.
• If adversary A is Type I, ID * has not been submitted to Partial Key Extraction.
• If adversary A is Type II, ID * has not been submitted to Secret Value and Public Key Extraction.
McCLS Scheme
McCLS scheme is motivated by the identity-based signature from [24] . Our verification phase algorithm requires one pairing operation only, hence McCLS scheme outperforms the other existing CLS schemes in terms of efficiency. Besides, message signing in McCLS scheme is fast as it involves no pairing computation. McCLS scheme is comprised of the following five stages.
• Setup. Given a cyclic group G 1 of prime order p, with an admissible pairing e and its generator P, KGC picks s ∈ Z * p and sets P pub = sP. Then Chooses two hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 and H 2 : {0, 1} * × G 1 → Z * p . The public system parameter list is (P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 ), and the master private key is msk = s.
• Extract Partial Private Key. Given an identity ID, KGC computes Q ID = H 1 (ID) and D ID = sH 1 (ID) . Output D ID as the partial private key corresponding to Q ID = H 1 (ID).
• Generate Key Pair. The user generates a secret value x ∈ Z * p , the public key is P ID = xP pub . The user's private key is S ID = x.
• Sign. Given the user's full private keys (D ID , S ID ) and a message M, user picks a number r ∈ Z * p and outputs a signature σ = (V, S, R) where
• Verification. Given the signature (V, S, R) of a message M for the identity ID, anyone in this algorithm can act a verifier to compute h = H 2 (M, R, P ID ). Then checks whether (P pub ,V −hR, S/h, Q ID ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, that is, computes whether e(P pub , Q ID ) = e(V − hR, S/h). If yes, accept the signature. Otherwise, reject it.
Analysis of McCLS Scheme
In this section, we analyze the correctness, performance and security proof of McCLS scheme.
Correctness
The correctness of McCLS scheme can be verified as follows:
e(V − hR, S/h) = e(hrP − hrP + xhP, S/h) = e(xhP, D ID /xh) = e(P pub , Q ID ).
Note that e(P pub , Q ID ) is independent of the message, and only needs to be computed once and for all. So McCLS scheme is more efficient than other previous schemes.
Performance
McCLS scheme only requires two scalar multiplication in signature phase and two scalar multiplication computations and one pairing operation in verification phase. The pairing operations are expensive comparing with scalar multiplication and exponentiation.
The comparison between the exiting schemes and McCLS scheme according to efficiency of sign and verification algorithms and the length of public keys is shown in Table 1 . It shows that McCLS scheme has the lowest pairing operations requirement and has the same length of public key as other CLS schemes. Pklen: the public key length; s: the scalar multiplication computation; p: the pairing operation; e: the exponential computation.
Security Proof
In this section we discuss the security of McCLS scheme under the security model discussed in section 3. The main theorems concerning the security of our scheme are: Theorem 2. Our certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against a Type I adversary A I in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G 1 is infeasible.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A I which has an advantage in attacking McCLS scheme. We build a challenger C that uses A I to solve the CDH problem. C receives an instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDHP. Its goal is to compute abP. On the setup phase, C sets P as the generator of the group, and sets P pub = aP where a is the master key, which is unknown to A I . In order to avoid collision, C maintains a list L = (ID i , D ID i , s ID i , P ID i ) throughout the game. The list is initially empty. C then starts to answer oracle queries with the following procedures [26] :
• H 1 Queries. Suppose A I makes q H 1 queries to H 1 oracle, where q H 1 denotes the maximum number of queries. Randomly choose j ∈ [1, q H 1 ]. When an identity ID i is submitted to oracle H 1 where
where Q i = bP, y i = ⊥ (indicate to failure). Otherwise, C generates a random number y i and lets
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• Partial Key Extraction (ID i ) Queries. When A I makes the query on ID i , if ID i = ID * , then C aborts and halts the simulation. Otherwise C finds L and performs as follows: -If the list L does not contain
• Public Key Extraction (ID i ) Queries. When A I makes the query on ID i , C finds L and performs as follows:
Otherwise, C picks a random x i ∈ Z * p , and sets
p , and sets
• Secret Value Extraction (ID i ) Queries. When A I makes the query on ID i , if ID i = ID * , then C aborts and halts the simulation. Otherwise C finds L and performs as follows:
Then C saves the value and adds full private keys ( • Public Key Replacement(ID i , P ′ ID ) Queries. When A I makes the query on
), C finds L and performs as follows:
and s ID i = ⊥. And then C adds to the list L.
• H 2 Queries. When A I makes the query on (m, R,
has been defined. If defined, return the list to A I . Otherwise, C picks a random h j ∈ Z * p as the hash value and returns h j , and adds it to L 2 .
• Sign Queries(ID i , M j ). When A I asks for a signature by user ID i on message M j . C finds
not found, C runs Public Key Extraction Queries. Note that if ID i = ID * , A I is able to generate signature on any messages using corresponding full private keys (D ID i , s ID i ). As far as ID i = ID * , assume that P ID i is current public key and corresponding private key s ID i = x, where x ∈ Z * p , additionally submits through the A I . This is because the public key has been replaced earlier by A I , then C cannot know the corresponding private key and thus the signing oracle's answer may not be correct.
On receiving sign queries, C does the following:
1. Choose random r j ∈ Z * p and look up the list L 2 for h j , if not found, C runs H 2 Queries to get h j . 2. Compute V j = h j (x + a r j )P and S j = r j Q i = r j bP, R j = xP; 3. Return the signature σ = (V j , S j , R j ). Now, σ is returned to A I , which appears to be valid signature since e(V j − h j R, S j /h j ) = e(h j (x + a r j )P) − h j xP, r j bP/h j ) = e(h j aP/r j , r j bP/h j ) = e(aP, bP) = e(P pub , Q ID ).
Finally, A I will output a valid forgery r = (ID j , M j , R j , S j ,V j ). If ID j = ID * , C outputs the FAIL and aborts the simulation. Otherwise, we can compute r j through r j =
is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Apply r j to S j , we have
So abP = S j (V j − h j x)/h j is the answer to our CDHP instance. If the A I can break our scheme, then the attacker solves the CDH problem.
Theorem 3. Our certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against the A II adversary in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G 1 is infeasible.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A II which has advantage in attacking McCLS scheme. We build a challenger C that uses A II to solve the CDH problem. C receives an instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDHP. Its goal is to compute abP. On the setup phase, C sets P as the generator of the group, and sets P pub = sP where s is the master key, which is known to A II . In order to avoid collision, C maintains a list L = (ID i , s ID i , P ID i ) throughout the game. The list is initially empty. C then starts to answer oracle queries with the following procedures:
• 
where Q i = aP, y i = ⊥ (indicate to failure). Otherwise, C generates a random number y i and lets Q i = y i P, and saves L 1 = (ID i , Q i , y i ).
• Public Key Extraction (ID i ) Queries. When A II makes the query on ID i , C finds L and performs as follows:
-If the list L contains (ID i , s ID i , P ID i ), C checks whether P ID i = ⊥. If P ID i = ⊥, C returns P ID i to A II . Otherwise, C picks a random x i ∈ Z * p , and sets P ID i = bP pub , s ID i = x i . C then returns P ID i to A II and adds (s ID i , P ID i ) to L.
-If the list L does not contain (ID i , s ID i , P ID i ), C picks a random x i ∈ Z * p , and sets P ID i = bP pub , s ID i = x i . C then returns P ID i to A II and adds (s ID i , P ID i ) to L.
McCLS
• Secret Value Extraction (ID i ) Queries. When A II makes the query on ID i , if ID i = ID * , then C aborts and halts the simulation. Otherwise C finds L and performs as follows:
-If the list L contains (ID i , s ID i , P ID i ), C checks whether P ID i = ⊥. If P ID i = ⊥, C makes Public Key Extraction Queries to obtain (s ID i = x i , P ID i = x i P pub ). Then C saves the value and adds user's private keys s ID i to the list L.
-If the list L does not contain (ID i , s ID i , P ID i ), C executes Public Key Extraction Queries to obtain (s ID i , P ID i ). Then C saves the value and adds user's private keys s ID i to the list L.
• H 2 Queries. When A II makes the query on (m, R, P ID i ), C first scans whether a list L 2 = (m, R, P ID i , h j ) has been defined. If defined, return the list to A II . otherwise, C picks a random h j ∈ Z * p as the hash value of Hand returns h j , and adds it to L 2 .
• Sign Queries(ID i , M j ). When A II asks for a signature by user ID i on message M j . C finds
1. Choose random r j ∈ Z * p and look up the list L 2 for h j , if not found, C runs H 2 Queries to get h j . , r j x i aP/h j ) = e(sP, aP) = e(P pub , Q ID ).
Compute V j = (
Finally, A II will output a valid forgery r = (ID j , M j , R j , S j ,V j ). If ID j = ID * , C outputs the FAIL and aborts the simulation. Otherwise, we can compute r through r j = sh j +bh j xV j , since (P pub ,V j P−h j R j , S j /h j , Q i ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Apply r j to S j , we have
So abP = V j r j −Q i S j h j h j is the answer to our CDHP instance. If the A II can break our scheme, then the attacker solves the CDH problem. 
Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, an efficient McCLS scheme named McDV based on the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) is proposed. We start the simulations using QualNet [19] in order to compare the original AODV protocol without any security requirements with McDV based on the CLS with routing authentication extension. We also evaluate the performance of two schemes under 1, 2 and 4 nodes redirection attacks and 1, 2 and 4 nodes rushing attacks, as this is more realistic in the real emergency applications. Our implementation retains most of the AODV mechanisms, such as route discovery, reverse path setup, forwarding path setup, route maintenance, and so on. In our experiments, 20 nodes move around in a rectangular area of 900×900m according to a mobility model, i.e., the random waypoint model. The nodes spread randomly over the network. Each node starts its journey from a random location to a random destination. We vary the nodes speed from 0m/s to 20m/s, and set the nodes pause time as 0s. Table 2 lists the values of the common parameters used in all experiment. Other parameters will be given in the description of each specific experiment.
The performance of McDV is compared using the following performance metrics.
• Packet Delivery Ratio: Ratio of the number of packets received by the destination over the number of packets sent by the source.
• RREQ Ratio: Ratio of sum number of RREQ initiated, forwarded and retried over the sum of number of data packets sent as source and data packets forwarded. Present the number of RREQ packets transmitted through the network.
• End-to-End Delay: The average time experienced by each packet when traveling from the source to the destination.
• Throughput: Ratio of the total bytes sent by all sources nodes over the total time.
• Packet Drop Ratio: Ratio of the number of packets discarded by attacking nodes over the total number of packets sent by all sources.
Effects of various metrics on different protocols:
Experiments in this section are used to study the performance between McDV and AODV. The results are shown in Fig. 1 .
The packet delivery ratio and the RREQ ratio are shown in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b) , respectively. We can see that McDV could work well in the experiment because the packet delivery ratio and RREQ ratio in AODV are very similar to that of McDV, without causing any substantial degradation of the network performance. As nodes speed increases, the number of data packets reaching the destination decreases and the number of RREQ packets transmitting through the networks increases. End-to-end delay of McDV scheme is shown in Fig. 1(c) . Our scheme has a little bit higher delay than that of AODV due to the exchange of packets during authentication phase of the security process. Result shows that McDV has a similar end-to-end delay with AODV at a relatively low speed, however, when the maximum speed of nodes is higher than 15m/s, AODV outperforms McDV scheme. More specifically, our scheme needs authentication operation, and those additional operations are computed in our scheme but not in AODV. We only measure delays for data packets that survived to reach their destination.
Throughput of McDV works well as result shown in Fig. 1(d) because the effect of throughput of the network is very small (around 0.16%). However, if this scheme in other real scenarios such as disaster scenarios, battlefield scenarios, or even very high-speed scenarios, the effect of throughput of the network may reduce more than this.
Effects of multiple attackers with redirection attacks: We simulated AODV and McDV under redirection attacks by varying the nodes speed from 0m/s to 20m/s while setting the number of attack nodes to 1, 2 and 4 nodes, respectively. We first study the packet delivery ratio and packet dropped ratio. From the results of Fig. 2(a) , we can see that packet delivery ratio drops as the speed increases when we use AODV routing protocol under redirection attacks. Meanwhile, we observe that given the same speed of nodes, the higher the number of attackers, the lower the packet delivery ratio in AODV. The packet delivery ratio in the case of 4 attackers declines dramatically to 43% as the speed of nodes increases to 15m/s. In contrast, the packet delivery ratio of McDV maintains from 94% to 98% even the number of attackers increases to 4 which is slightly lower than normally packet delivery ratio as we can see in Fig. 1(a) . All of these are brought by the fact that our routing scheme retains most of the AODV's mechanisms and the extra operations of sign phase and verification phase are very low. As we would expect from Fig. 2(b) , McDV is able to detect all redirection attacks and the packet dropped ratio is zero. On the contrary, as the attack nodes increase, the packet dropped ratio also rises at the same speed when using AODV. Especially, the highest packet dropped ratio of AODV is almost 25% at speed of 15m/s. McDV can detect all the attacks because the node will verify the signature when it receives the packet. Only if this packet passes the verification, the receiving node updates its routing table entry according to the information carried in the packet. Otherwise, the node will drop this packet.
Readers may note that in Fig. 2(c) , given the same speed of nodes, the end-to-end Delay in the McDV under redirection attacks are slightly higher than the end-to-end delay in the AODV under redirection attacks. This is simply due to our definition of the end-to-end delay, which is defined as the time a packet takes to travel from the source to the destination. Given the same network size, the same number of senders and the same number of receivers, as attacker or more attackers are added to the network, the number of available nodes forwarding packet decreases, making the average end-to-end delay decrease.
The result in Fig. 2(d) shows the throughput in the network. We can see that the higher the attackers, the lower the throughput at the same speed in AODV. As the speed goes up in AODV, the throughput of network decreases. When the speed is 15m/s, the throughput of AODV drops to 76% comparing with that of original protocol. In contrast, our scheme has the similar trend as the original AODV protocol. As the speed is 15m/s and the network is under 4 redirection attackers, the most effect of throughput is Fig. 3(a) shows that, the higher the nodes speed, the lower the packet delivery ratio is when using AODV. However, the packer delivery ratio declines dramatically to 24% as the number of attackers increases to 4 nodes and at the speed of 20m/s. On the other hand, the lowest packet delivery ratio in McDV still maintains 95% when the nodes are at the speed of 15m/s. The Fig. 3(b) shows that, given the same speed, the higher the attacker node(s), the higher the packet dropped ratio is under AODV. In contrast, McDV can detect all the rushing attacks, thus the packet dropped ratio is zero.
These results indicate that the AODV protocol performs worse under the rushing attacks than under the redirection attacks. This is because we set the transmit distance as 740m to simulate the rushing attacks. In this situation, the malicious nodes may readily access to the forwarding group and discard all data packets. With the number of attackers increasing, the packet delivery ratio decreases and the packet dropped ratio rises. In contrast, McDV maintains high packet delivery ratio and the packet dropped ratio is zero. This is due to its less computation overhead and efficient implementation of signature and verification.
The Fig. 3(c) shows that the end-to-end delay in rushing attacks. McDV end-to-end delay is slightly higher than AODV end-to-end delay. The explanation for this is similar to the situation discussed in the case of redirection attacks. The difference is that when a node is converted to attacker, the probability of this attacker being selected into the forwarding group increases, and the average end-to-end delay decreases. Fig. 3(d) shows the throughput of two protocols under rushing attacks. Although mechanisms of redirection attacks and rushing attacks are different, they have a similar way to affect the throughput. The throughput drops more severely under rushing attacks than under redirection attacks. In particular, the lowest throughput almost drops to 63% under 4 rushing attacks when nodes at the speed of 20m/s. In contrast to the AODV protocol under rushing attacks, our scheme has very similar throughput to the original protocol.
Conclusion
An efficient certificateless signature scheme named McCLS is proposed in this paper. This scheme is based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model for emergency mobile wireless cyber-physical systems. Since McCLS only requires one pairing operation in the verification phase, and none in the signing phase, theoretically it is more efficient than existing certificateless signature schemes. We also present simulation of McDV which is based on McCLS scheme and compare its performance under two most common attacks (i.e. redirection attack and rushing attack) with typical protocol-AODV providing no protection mechanism. These results show that McDV can completely resist the two kinds of attacks without causing substantial degradation of network performance. In the future, we will further investigate security schemes in the wide physical environment. Thereby we can find schemes which either prevent more comprehensive external attacks or resist internal attacks from the compromised nodes. 
